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In exploring why and to what extent the Japanese model of participatory employment relations has changed at the turn of the century, this article criticizes prevalent paradigms of political economy, specifically the paradigms of the neoliberals and the institutionalists, instead proposing a theoretical alternative, that of agents' reflexivity in international competition. Contrary to the institutionalist arguments for the path-dependent persistence of a national model, the concepts of lifetime employment and seniority in Japan have changed from being sources of competitiveness to objects and conditions for reform. Additionally, in contrast to the neoliberals' expectations based on the universal relevance of liberal markets, the Japanese adjustments do not converge towards the American liberal market model, but instead generate new divergences inspired but not determined by foreign competitors.
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Those who once praised the Japanese economic model for high growth, low inflation and low unemployment, despite two oil shocks, instead became overly pessimistic throughout the 1990s due to the long-lasting recession and poor performance of that same Japanese economy. The Japanese attributes that supported relatively high performance until the late 1980s, such as lifetime employment, seniority and participatory production, came in for severe criticism. Considering the high performance of the US economy in the 1990s, neoliberals, based on the universal relevance of liberal markets, argue that the Japanese model is dead, and that Japan must (and will) adopt the US liberal market model (Lindsey and Lukas, 1998; Lin, 2001; Dornbusch, 1998; Krugman, 1996) . By contrast, many theorists of institutionalism, based on contextualized efficiency and path-dependent national patterns, claim that Japan persists in its path-dependent national model due to its unique culture -taken for granted within the culture -the interconnectedness of institutions and agents' efforts to utilize the comparative advantages of their institutions (Dore, 2000; Green, 2001; Isogai et al., 2000; Chesbrough, 1998; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hall and Soskice, 2001 ). However, neither the neoliberals' argument for simple convergence towards a liberal market economy nor the institutionalists' claim for the persistence of the original Japanese model can explain the dynamic changes happening within the Japanese model at the turn of the century. Contrary to the neoliberals' arguments, the Japanese industrial system is not converging towards the liberal market. Furthermore, in opposition to the neoliberals' explanation, the high performance of the American model in the 1990s is not because the US did not adopt the Japanese model, but because it successfully restructured its employment and production system, inspired by the Japanese model. This process of Japanization is also contrary to the path-dependent expectation of the institutionalists. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Japanese began to restructure their own institutions, inspired by foreign competitors, also contrary to institutionalist expectations. The Japanese methods, such as lifetime employment, seniority and participatory employment, that had been praised as sources of Japanese international competitiveness in the 1980s, are now undergoing changes, and those changes are, in turn, creating new divergences.
This article explores why and to what extent the Japanese model has changed, focusing on employment and production practices. Is the Japanese model converging towards the American liberal market? Why has the Japanese model in Japan suffered from a relative decline of international competitiveness? In order to better account for the dynamic transformation of the Japanese model, this article proposes the importance of agents' reflexivity in which institutions are continuously reflected upon and contested, while best practices are contextualized by national institutions. In particular, this article emphasizes the international context of competition in which agents, inspired by foreign competitors, reflect upon the relative competitiveness resulting from their institutions.
This article explores first what constitutes the Japanese model and why it achieved international competitiveness. This is followed by an examination of the internationalization of the Japanese model, i.e. industrial adjustments in foreign countries, inspired by the Japanese model. This internationalization of the Japanese model ironically turns back to the crisis of the Japanese model by changing the context of international competition. Finally, this article examines the extent to which the Japanese model of employment relations has changed at the turn of the century.
The Japanese Model
As the Japanese economy achieved apparent success in contrast to the low performance of so-called liberal market economies such as those of the US and the UK, many western industrial experts and social scientists began to focus on the sources of the competitiveness of the Japanese economic system. The Japanese model, coining the terms 'Toyotism' (vs Fordism), 'lean production', 'institutionalized capitalism' and 'non-liberal economic regime' (vs liberal regime), achieved a high international competitiveness by high quality, low costs, continuous improvement of products and production, and flexibility to respond to the market (Womack et al., 1990; Dohse et al., 1985; Hollingsworth, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Yamamura and Streeck, 2003) .
The core components of the Japanese model for high quality, low costs, high productivity, and continuous improvement and flexible production are characterized by 'long-term cooperative relations among economic agents', i.e. cooperative relations between management and employees as well as among companies, compared with short-term, arm's length relations in the Anglo-Saxon liberal market economy, although the focal points of the Japanese model differ slightly according to different researchers (Streeck and Yamamura, 2003: 2; Womack et al., 1990; Yamada, 2000; Dore, 1987 Dore, , 2000 OECD, 1973) . For example, the continuous improvement of products and production was realized by close cooperation not only between management and employees, but also among employees. Japanese employees organized in a team integrated various jobs such as production, quality control, repair functions. The Japanese multifunctional teams, known as 'lean production', could improve quality and efficiency continuously through a process of deliberation among workers. Similarly, the OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) and suppliers in Japan continuously improved their products and production by close cooperation, as seen in the just-in-time delivery practice. Japanese participatory cooperation for collective deliberation in a team constituted between employees and management as well as between companies stands in contrast to US Taylorist mass production in which conception and execution are not integrated -in the US, unskilled workers conducted narrowly defined jobs; suppliers also conducted jobs, following blueprints developed by the OEMs; rationalization was the domain of management and the OEMs (Womack et al., 1990) . In the US version of mass production, there was no feedback information and no deliberation among planners and executors.
Japanese lean production contrasts with the Tayloristic low skill model. For high quality and flexible production, employees need qualified but broad skill formation. While workers in the liberal market economy were undertrained due to their easy substitutability and easy layoffs, the Japanese workers were able to develop a higher level of skills based on long-term employment. In particular, the multifunctional jobs system in Japanese lean production developed workers' broad skills in a learning-by-doing process.
From the perspective of a high skill model vs a Tayloristic low skill model, Germany and Japan appear to be similar. But Japan differed from Germany in terms of skill formation and skill deployment in the production process (Green, 2001) . Based on the socially well-organized apprenticeship and training system, Germany developed high wages and high international competitiveness; compared with the US, German skilled workers operated in a relatively autonomous, flexible system. As many international studies showed, however, German professional specialization revealed rigidity in adopting new technology and adjusting to the turbulent market compared with the Japanese-style lean production practices because functional and occupation-oriented professional specialization deterred workers from developing cross-functional communication, and because it took time to iron out conflicts between professions (Herrigel, 1997; Herrigel and Sabel, 1999) .
While the German model showed strict job demarcation, the Japanese system did not have similar strict job jurisdiction. Japanese companies did not regard hiring as the purchase of occupational skills that workers acquired elsewhere. Japanese workers upgraded their skills while doing integrated tasks and circulating jobs in-house. Since Japanese workers were ready to accept reassignment and retraining for new skills, Japanese companies were good at applying different materials, machines and tools, as well as applying flexible changes to the work organization (Shirai, 2000; Green, 2001; Coriat et al., 2000) . Collective collaboration in cross-functional teamwork and in-house job training by conducting multiple jobs based on so-called lifetime employment enabled the Japanese companies, in particular export-oriented large companies, to achieve a considerable advantage compared with rigid mass producers until the late 1980s.
Many social scientists, particularly theorists of institutionalism, argue that the Japanese flexible production system could work well only in specifically Japanese institutions and culture, with its emphasis on lifetime employment, seniority, patient finance and collectivity. One of the key problems in a team-oriented lean production system is how to generate trusting cooperation among agents and how to reduce opportunism, like laziness. For example, in cross-functional teams in which workers have relative autonomy and address multifunctional jobs, workers might incline towards free-riding. Not only to reduce opportunism but also to induce active participation in collective teamwork like voluntary suggestions for improvement, lean production requires high levels of trust among economic agents. Thus, in explaining the Japanese model, many theorists of the varieties of capitalism emphasized particular Japanese institutions and culture, such as the aforementioned lifetime employment, seniority, patient finance and trusting culture (Dore, 1997; Koike, 2000) . Due to job security and compensation based on seniority, employees had incentives to develop their skills in order to climb the hierarchy based on seniority; due to employees' long-term attachment and loyalty towards their own firms, Japanese companies could invest in human capital formation such as in-house training (Morishima, 2001; Koike, 1994) . Many social scientists also emphasized aspects of Japanese culture like harmony with others and a prevailing group mentality (Takezawa and Whitehill, 1981; Dore, 1987 Dore, , 1997 Ohtsu, 2002; Hofstede, 1983; Deresky, 1997) . Based on an extensive international study, Geert Hofstede (1983) argues that Japan is characterized by collectivism and masculinity; Helen Deresky holds that the Japanese culture is explained by the concepts of wa (harmony) and amae (love), originating in the shinto religion. Without these cultural and social institutions, collaborative participation in a team production system is said to be impossible.
For example, in the US, where a short-term market and individualism prevailed, workers were controlled by narrowly defined jobs and close surveillance by management. Many theorists of the varieties of capitalism presented the Japanese model of highly skilled and flexible production based on long-term commitment as an enviable alternative to the US liberal market model characterized by easy layoff based on short-term contracts, low skills and low attachments. In addition, many theorists of the varieties of capitalism argue that this Japanese system is difficult to transfer to another country due to its embeddedness in Japanese culture.
Since the mid-1980s, however, western manufacturers have successfully made industrial adjustments inspired by the Japanese model. This tremendous effort of restructuring was not just a copy of the Japanese model, but a creative process of industrial adjustments. This Japanization in the US and Germany reduced or reversed the competitive gap between Japan and the western countries; ironically, it is now threatening the Japanese, as is examined in the next section.
Internationalization of the Japanese Model and its Crises
The internationalization of the Japanese model by foreign competitors refutes the institutionalist expectation that western countries would fail to adopt the Japanese model of lean production due to the absence of unique Japanese institutions and culture. In addition, the successful adoption of the Japanese model in the US is also contradictory to the neoliberals' argument that the US improved its competitiveness because of an avoidance to adopt the Japanese model. However, industrial adjustments in the US and Germany are not a simple copy of the Japanese model. Through a creative process of adjustments, foreign competitors were able to reduce or reverse the competitive edge that the Japanese industries achieved in the 1980s. This section explores to what extent the Japanese model has been internationalized and how the Japanization of foreign competitors reflects the original Japanese model in Japan.
From the mid-1980s, US manufacturers began to adopt the Japanese methods of participatory employment, team-oriented work and collaborative inter-firm relations. Many empirical studies testify to an impressive growth of productivity due to industrial 330 Economic and Industrial Democracy 25 (3) commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
restructuring, inspired by the Japanese model of participatory employment and team-oriented work (Helper, 1998; Adler et al., 1999; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996) . According to an extensive study conducted in 1994, American workers increased their voice in their companies in deciding how to organize their jobs, although US workers' influence is still negligible in issues such as benefits distribution and increase of pay (Freedman and Rogers, 1999: 48-51) . The growth of US productivity is not simply due to the effects of the IT industry. The Council of Economic Advisers (2001) and Cohen et al. (2001) report that US productivity began to grow from the mid-1980s, well before the IT industry spread widely. The reason American manufacturers gained market competitiveness is that they successfully restructured, adopting more flexible production equipment, training workers more broadly, giving employees more flexible job assignments, reducing hierarchical management structure and adopting teamwork (Piore, 2000) . Through these industrial adjustments inspired by the Japanese model, western competitors like the US and Germany greatly changed the status of the competitive edge claimed by the Japanese economy in the 1980s. As Table 1 shows, Japan's labour and total factor productivity (TFP) declined. From 1995 on, the difference Kwon: Japanese Employment Relations in Transition 331 in labour productivity and TFP between Japan and its competitors (the US and Germany) was particularly wide.
How did the productivity ratio of Japan and its western competitors come to be reversed? The first reason for the relative decline of Japanese competitiveness is, as Table 2 shows, that the Japanese model was itself not widespread in Japan. Not all Japanese companies adopted lean production. The Japanese model of lifetime employment and participatory employment is not necessarily predetermined by the embedded culture inherited from the Tokukawa era. This specific industrial model was established in the process of suppressing radical unions influenced by socialism and communism in the 1940s and 1950s (Katz, 2003: 250) .
The Japanese model of participatory employment and teamoriented work developed mainly in large export-oriented corporations such as automobile manufacturers, which make up only a small portion of the Japanese economy (10 percent of total employment). Small firms in Japan traditionally retained short-term employment and low wage systems (Dohse et al., 1985) . Until the late 1980s, the relatively high performance of Japanese model companies in flagship industries such as the automobile industry had been enough to support domestic-oriented, less efficient industries.
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Economic and Industrial Democracy 25(3) But the competitive edge enjoyed by these export-oriented manufacturers has been eroding as foreign competitors adopt the Japanese methods of participatory employment and lean production (Posen, 2002: 106-9 ). In addition, as small companies in Germany and the US improved and developed collaborative teamwork with their OEMs, less efficient small firms in Japan became more burdensome to Japanese economic performance. As Table 2 also shows, SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in Japan are lagging behind in adopting high technology and efficient management methods, although they employ about 75 percent of the workforce in Japan. The reason for this relatively low level of diffusion of an efficient management and production system is governmental protection (Herbig and Jacobs, 1999: 6; Posen, 2002: 76, 106-9; Katz, 2003) . According to a McKinsey Global Institute (2000) study, about 90 percent of the domestic sector did not adopt new technology and efficient management techniques because they enjoyed a protected market. The productivity of the domestically oriented sectors declined even further compared with their US counterparts. It is more problematic that the least efficient sectors increased employment while efficient sectors reduced employment in the process of restructuring. The relative decline of SMEs and domestically oriented industries caused a decline in the productivity of the Japanese flagship industries because it forced the larger companies to pay high input prices -for example, Toyota paid higher prices for glass, rubber, steel and other primary materials (Katz, 2003: 41-68, 219-20) .
The reason for the relative growth of US and German productivity is not simply their adoption of the Japanese model of crossfunctional teams and participatory employment in varieties of industries including manufacturing and services. US and German competitiveness also grew because they did not simply copy the Japanese model. For example, German manufacturers, particularly SMEs, regained international competitiveness by creatively adopting cross-functional teams. Initially, many institutionalists like Wolfgang Streeck (1996) expected that, due to traditional vocationoriented structure and norms, Germans would not adopt Japanese-style cross-functional teams. But in the early 1990s, when the traditional professional specialization was revealed as relatively rigid in developing innovation and close collaboration between different functional areas compared with Japanese lean producers, Germans began to adopt Japanese-style cross-functional teams (Apfelthaler et al., 2002) . But, as in the US, the German adoption of Japanese lean production is not an imitation but a creative reinterpretation. Germans developed a mixed form of the cross-functional team structure in which advanced vocation-oriented training and structure remained important, although process-oriented teams have the initiative in operating business (Kwon, 2003) . While the Japanese SMEs were relatively weak due to their low rate of adoption of in-house training and participatory management, German SMEs became strong because they utilized not only Japanese cross-functional teams but also highly skilled workers produced by a socially well-organized training system.
The way teamwork is governed in Germany and the US is different from that of Japan as well. Jobs performed by Japanese teams are highly standardized and the governance of teamwork is relatively hierarchical, while European teams operate in a more democratic system in which workers take on the roles carried out by former supervisors. For example, works councils and trade unions in Germany actively participated in the adoption of lean production with the intention of reanimating the humanization of work based on the Swedish system of autonomous groupwork (Ju¨rgens, 2000: 20-1; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Pruijt, 2003) . The elected spokesperson in a German team does not have hierarchical prerogatives. In some teams in the US -for example, in the GM Saturn Corporation -unions and workers participate extensively in decision-making (Katz and Darbishire, 2000: 11) .
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the US system gained competitiveness not only by this restructuring inspired by the Japanese model, but also by improving the openness and diversity of intellectual knowledge. This departs from the original Japanese model based on exclusionary, in-house skill formation and deployment as well as ethnically centred closeness. In the US, the number of immigrants increased tremendously from slightly over 3 million in the 1960s to nearly 9 million in the 1990s. This increase in immigration contributed not only to the emergence of a dynamic labour force but also to product innovation. In 1990, about 60 percent of doctorates in engineering in the US were foreign students, who created a pool of innovative knowledge in US enterprises. By contrast, the number of foreign engineers and researchers in Japan is very low (Dirks et al., 2000: 547) . In the US, this diversity was stabilized by equal opportunities for employment, although income inequality increased (Piore, 2000: 45-9) . In addition, contrary to the expectation of 334 Economic and Industrial Democracy 25 (3) commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
comparative institutional advantage theorists, American enterprises developed regional training systems. Regional training centres, supported by American OEMs, develop systematic programmes for training workers (Itagaki, 1998: 17) .
Transformation of the Original Japanese Model
The original Japanese model of production is characterized by collaborative participatory teamwork, which works well due to employees' trusting commitment and loyalty. Many theorists of institutionalism argue that trust and social norms are embedded in Japanese culture and institutions; that they are not only difficult to transfer to other countries but also resistant to change because of their path dependency and the interconnectedness of institutions which are often taken for granted. Contrary to the path-dependency claim, however, existing norms and practices in the Japanese system are not taken for granted and not beyond reinterpretation by reflexive agents. Norms and meanings of institutions are continuously reconstituted by agents who reinterpret the meanings of their relations and institutional conditions. First, employees' trust in and commitment to their companies, which were the basis for high quality production and in-house job training, are declining due to mandatory retirement, job insecurity and the increase of non-regular workers which happened in the process of restructuring. According to an extensive survey conducted by the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 1 in 1997, examining work orientation in Japan and advanced industrial countries, Japanese workers do not have such a high level of affective commitment as people expected.
As Table 3 shows, in terms of affective commitments (Q1 and Q2), loyalty of American employees to their firms is higher than that of the Japanese, although Japanese employees have higher expectations of job continuance than that of US employees (Q3 and Q4). Japanese affective commitments are ranked 12th among 21 advanced countries, while US affective commitments rank 2nd. It is noteworthy that long-term employment does not necessarily generate affective commitments among employees. Many studies actually reveal that affective commitments are more important to work performance than continuance commitments. Many other studies also confirm the decline of Japanese employees' trusting commitment. For example, according to a study by Nikkei Research, Inc., conducted in 1995 examining employees in large corporations, about one-quarter reported that their sense of belonging to the company was fading away (Nikkei Shinbun, 20 November 1995). Manpower, Inc.'s 2002 International Employee Loyalty Survey reports that Japanese employees' loyalty to companies is very low compared with other advanced countries such as the US and Germany. This survey shows that loyalty in Japan has declined, while that of the US has increased. It is noteworthy that, according to this survey, a significant proportion of Japanese human resource managers do not believe that employee loyalty is important in driving business outcomes. This means that Japanese managers are less likely than US or German managers to focus on improvement of employee loyalty in order to improve business competitiveness (Manpower, Inc., 2002) .
Changes in the status of employees' trusting commitments and work ethics are not simply the result of the social effects of karoshi (death due to extreme hard work), but are, more importantly, due to a 'sense of betrayal' that prevailed among workers during the process of industrial adjustments in the 1990s (Rowen and Toyoda, 2002: 21; Kingston, 2001: 92-3; Ohtsu, 2002: 411) . Traditionally, employees' trusting commitments in Japan were generated by job security (lifetime employment) and seniority. But as these traditional Japanese methods receded, employees' loyalty also declined. As employees in the lifetime employment system began to age, problems such as slow growth of productivity as well as wage costse.g. the proportion of employees older than 45 increased from 34.8 percent in 1976 to 48 percent in 1997 -became evident. In response, Japanese companies adopted mandatory retirement, layoffs, transfer of workers and a flattening of the age-earning profile. The proportion of Japanese companies that use early retirement increased from 20 percent in the early 1980s to about 40 percent in 1995 (Kingston, 2001: 92-3; Dirks et al., 2000: 526-33; Mroczkowski and Hanaoka, 1998: 22-3) . It is noteworthy that Japan's adjustment policies such as mandatory retirement and layoffs do not indicate a convergence towards the western liberal market based on external labour markets and easy layoffs. Although Japanese companies wanted more open and flexible employment systems, they created different strategies based on institutional conditions such as less development of external labour markets.
Kwon: Japanese Employment Relations in Transition 337
commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
In particular, dismissal and mandatory retirement in Japan during this recession have been carried out against mature labour. This is in contrast to the patterns of layoff in Western Europe and the US, in which dismissal and early retirement normally affect less skilled and younger people (Shirai, 2000: 144-6) . The concepts of lifetime employment and seniority have changed from being sources of competitiveness to objects and conditions of reform. In particular, employers have recently become more critical of unions' demands for unanimous pay-hikes based on tenure and age. An increasing number of Japanese firms have changed their traditional compensation system away from seniority towards an individual performance-based system, although, unlike the US, wage disparity in Japan has not increased due to performancebased payment (Morishima, 2002; Shinozaki, 2002) . The portion of performance-based compensation increased from 42 percent in 1978 to 75 percent in 1995, replacing the seniority model. In 1998, about 80 percent of listed corporations planned to adopt individual performance-based pay systems (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 28 February 1998: 13; 22 April 1998: 15; Japanese Institute of Labour, 2002: 3; Coriat et al., 2000: 184) . But these policies, such as mandatory retirement and performance-based payment, undermine the traditional value of long-term employment and the seniority principle.
In addition, replacing regular workers with non-regular workers drastically affected workplace morale. According to the Ministry of Labour Special Survey, about 30 percent of all employees in Japan are non-regular as of 2000 (Japan Labor Bulletin, 2000: 1-2). As Table 4 shows, it is more noteworthy that the recent trend towards using non-regular workers is in contrast to the traditional pattern in which non-regular workers decreased during recession while regular workers maintained their jobs due to their skills accumulated through in-house training. In 1997-2001, the number of regular employees in Japan sharply declined by 1.71 million, while the number of non-regular workers increased by 2.06 million.
The fact that non-regular workers are replacing regular workers indicates that Japanese companies have changed their traditional values of high skills based on in-house training and employees' loyalty supported by lifetime employment, instead considering labour costs and the flexibility of the labour market. As a Joint Labour Management 1998 survey documents, workplace morale has declined as the number of non-regular workers has increased 338 Economic and Industrial Democracy 25 (3) commercial use or unauthorized distribution. (Morishima, 2001) . Although Japanese companies have not developed an external labour market, the adjustments of employment in the 1990s have resulted in the deterioration of traditional employment relationships by departing from the traditional principle of exchange between lifetime employment and employees' loyalty. This change in employment policy is also related to the evaluation of work organization of participatory employment and consensusoriented management. Although Japanese companies still appreciate team-oriented work rather than adopting liberal market models of a free labour market and easy layoffs, Japanese managers put less priority on traditional participatory practices based on high morality and lifetime employment. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1988 and 1995, the proportion of companies with joint labour management committees (JLMC) did not significantly decline over this period. But, the number of JLMC meetings in all companies fell significantly from 14 times a year to nine times in this period (Kato, 2000: 12-13) . Traditionally, special committees, such as productivity committees, contributed to the effectiveness of the JLMC and participatory management. But the average number of special committees fell from 3.3 in 1988 to 2.8 in 1995. In particular, the JLMCs were much less likely to ask employees' opinions about currently hot issues such as employer transfer, layoffs, mandatory retirement and compensation in 1995 than they were in 1988. For example, the proportion of establishments without unions in which the JLMCs asked employee representatives' opinions on the issue of employee transfer declined from 19 percent in 1988 to 4 percent in 1995; on the issue of layoffs, the proportion declined from 23 percent in 1988 to 12 percent in 1995; on the issue of mandatory retirement, the proportion declined (Kato, 2000: Fig. 11 ). Many managers did not believe that an improvement in participatory practices would increase market competitiveness. Furthermore, many managers in Japan began to believe that participatory practices served as an obstacle to the timely adjustment of management (Kato, 2000: 47) . Although formal institutions like JLMCs and shopfloor committees still exist, the meaning and effects of participatory employment practices have been retreating in the last decade. Japanese unions (enterprise unions), which had been praised as a vitally important source for stability and harmony between management and labour within the enterprise, are now also declining. For example, the unionization rate (union members divided by number of employees) declined from 34.7 percent in 1975 34.7 percent in , to 28.9 percent in 1985 34.7 percent in , 23.8 percent in 1995 34.7 percent in and 22.4 percent in 1998 34.7 percent in (Shirai, 2000 . In addition, the role of conflict resolution traditionally played by Japanese enterprise unions, also declined despite the formal existence of enterprise unions. Recently, individual labourmanagement conflicts have increased. For example, the number of cases concerning workplace disputes over daily employment and working conditions, dealt with by the Labour Standards Inspection Offices, increased to 20,000 in 1994. Similarly, the number of cases of consultation that the Labour Administration Offices and the Women's and Young Workers Offices deal with have also exceeded 75,000 and 10,000, respectively (Shirai, 2000: 119) . According to a survey by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (formerly the Ministry of Labour), the frequency with which the Comprehensive Labour Counselling Desks services are utilized, as a means of resolving labour disputes, sharply increased in 2002, by 70 percent from the previous year. Most cases are related to dismissals and deterioration of working conditions.
Conclusion
The neoliberals' emphasis on the universal relevancy of the liberal market and the institutionalists' arguments for the path-dependent persistence of a national model cannot explain the dynamic changes seen in national economies in a context of continuously changing international competition, where the creative adjustments of national economies are constituted through global competition. The Japanese model of participatory employment relations that had been praised for its international competitiveness in the 1980s is now changing from one marked by 'exclusionary but trusting' relations to a more open model; this change shows how trusting participatory employment based on a closed system of lifetime employment and inhouse skills formation was revealed as too rigid to adopt rapidly changing technology and was not successful in competition with the participatory employment model based on an open market (the US) and on cross-functional teams based on vocational specialization (Germany). Contrary to the non-reflexive, path-dependent arguments of institutionalism, the Japanese have reflected upon their own norms and institutions of lifetime employment, seniority and participatory employment, inspired by foreign competitors, as the Americans and the Germans were themselves inspired by the Japanese competition. Concepts of lifetime employment and seniority have changed from being sources of competitiveness to objects and conditions for reform.
Although the Japanese have adopted more open and flexible policies by departing from the traditional model of lifetime employment and employees' loyalty, new methods are not converging towards the American liberal model. For example, in the face of the low development of an external labour market, the strategies of mandatory retirement, transfer of employees and replacing regular with non-regular workers were adopted despite the fact that these policies undermine the traditional competitive basis of consensus-based, participatory employment relations. The individual performancebased systems adopted in Japan do not generate wage inequality as much as those of the US. Although traditional methods of improving efficiency through employees' loyalty have been discredited, many industrialists still believe in the essential efficiency of lean production. Now it is Japan's turn to creatively adjust its institutions, in the same way that the US and Germany, inspired by the Japanese model, did. This article maintains that national models do not necessarily converge towards the liberal model, nor do they persist in their traditional pattern; agents continuously reflect upon their own norms and institutions in the context of international competition, which creative adjustments inspired by foreign competitors continuously reconstitute.
